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A B S T R A C T
Many intellectuals enthusiastically denounce those who argue that genes play some role in cognitive differences
between human populations. However, such proposals are perfectly reasonable and are, in fact, consistent with
the Darwinian research tradition in which most modern social scientists profess to operate. We argue that po-
pulation-based cognitive differences are congruent with our best understanding of the world because there are
strong reasons to believe that different environments and niches selected for different physical and psychological
traits, including general cognitive ability. Like most hereditarians (those who believe it likely that genes con-
tribute to differences in psychological traits among human populations), we do not believe there is decisive
evidence about the causes of differences in cognitive ability. But we will argue that a partial genetic hypothesis is
most consistent with the Darwinian research tradition.
When Darwin's theory of natural selection was originally advanced,
it challenged the prevailing religious orthodoxy in Victorian England.
Most importantly and most “dangerously,” it suggested that the Biblical
view of special creation was merely mythical, and that humans, like
other animals, were biological “accidents” resulting from millions of
years of evolution. Today, Darwin's theory challenges another ortho-
doxy: The view that all populations of humans have an equal dis-
tribution of socially valued traits. The intense anger elicited by the
argument that some of the well-known Black-White IQ gap is caused by
genetics reveals the emotional fervour with which the beliefs of the
modern orthodoxy are held. Responses to claims about cognitive dif-
ferences among human populations have become even more furious
recently, despite the fact that gaps in intelligence and achievement
among various populations persist around the globe, including in places
where environmental conditions are ostensibly equalizing (e.g.,
Marks, 2014). Because of this, modern Darwinism in practice is severely
limited when applied to humans. In this article, we will argue that this
modern orthodoxy is almost certainly wrong because (1) human po-
pulations vary; (2) they vary in predictable, patterned, and measurable
ways; (3) they vary on a number of psychological traits; and (4) genetic
differences plausibly explain at least some of the variance in these
traits.
We do not attempt to provide a completely comprehensive tour of
the evidence on cognitive ability differences among human populations
(see Jensen, 1998; Nisbett et al., 2012; Rushton & Jensen, 2005). Ra-
ther, we attempt to make the philosophical and theoretical case that
hereditarianism—the view that a substantial proportion (20% or more)
of differences in psychological traits within and among human popu-
lations is caused by genes—is more fruitful, parsimonious, and pro-
ductive than is environmentalism—the view that almost all of the dif-
ferences in psychological traits either within or among human
populations is caused by environmental forces. We therefore urge
scholars to overcome their understandable squeamishness and dis-
comfort with hereditarianism1 to discuss it honestly and judiciously, so
that researchers can fulfill the promise of the Darwinian revolution in
psychology.
Although accounts of human evolution and adaptation to local en-
vironments are promulgated in mainstream textbooks and widely ac-
cepted among academics (e.g., Molnar, 2006), they are worth briefly
covering because they form the basis for broad theoretical considera-
tions that support the contention that human populations vary in
physical and mental traits at least partially because of differences in
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genes. Anatomically modern humans likely evolved in East Africa be-
tween 300,000 and 100,000 years ago (Stringer, 2012). At some point
after roughly 150,000 years ago, these humans began to exit Africa into
the Near East. By 45,000 years ago, humans had spread throughout
much of Asia, Europe, and Oceania; and by 10,000, they had spread
into America (Bae, Douka, & Petraglia, 2017; Klein, 2009;
Stringer, 2000). After leaving Africa, humans encountered many novel
climatological and ecological regions and therefore faced different se-
lective regimes from the ones they faced inside Africa. Researchers have
shown that the story of human evolution is more complicated than was
once assumed, with waves of war and migration leading various human
groups to blend with or displace other groups (Reich, 2018). However,
the basic story remains: The humans that left Africa faced different
environments and climates from those that prevailed in Africa, and
populations were isolated enough from each other for natural and
sexual selection to produce nontrivial differences among them.
Perhaps the most obvious difference among human populations is
their respective skin colors. The average modern Norwegian has fair
skin; the average modern Saudi Arabian has olive skin; and the average
Sub-Saharan African has dark skin Jablonski (2014). These differences
are correlated with the intensity of UV radiation in the population's
ancestral environment such that dark skin is related to high intensities
of radiation. The exact reasons for skin color variation among humans
are not entirely known, but researchers are fairly confident that dark
skin functions as a kind of sunscreen, protecting against cutaneous and
systemic folate degradation (Jablonski & Chaplin, 2017). And although
the causes of lighter skin are still debated, many researchers champion
its relation to pre-vitamin D3 synthesis (Jones, Lucock, Veysey, &
Beckett, 2018; but see, e.g., Frost, 2007).
Another interesting difference among human populations is that
some have adaptations to extreme altitude (Bigham, 2016). At high
altitudes (greater than or equal to 2500 m), low barometric pressure
presents significant challenges to human health, survival, and re-
production. Humans who visit places of high altitude may experience
temporary, acute “mountain sickness”; those who reside in such places
may experience chronic mountain sickness. Despite this, there are
human populations who do permanently dwell in high altitude (and
have for thousands of years) areas such as the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau
and the Semien Plateau in Ethiopia. In different populations, the
adaptations to altitude are slightly different and the Tibetan adapta-
tions may have been facilitated by introgression of DNA (through in-
terbreeding) from Denisovans or Denisovan-related individuals
(Huerta-Sánchez et al., 2014).
Not only did humans encounter new environments during their
evolution, but they also created them. This process, of an organism
actively altering its environment, is called niche construction
(Laland, Matthews, & Feldman, 2016). Capable of spinning fine silky
webs which it uses for catching prey, laying eggs, and many other
crucial behaviors, the spider is one of the most recognizable non-human
animals that has created a remarkable niche for itself—although there
are many other striking examples, such as beavers and wasps. Humans
create a flexible niche of norms, traditions, and technologies, called
culture, which has had profound influences not just on immediate
human behavior, but on human evolution (Henrich, 2016). For ex-
ample, after humans began to domesticate animals, some dairying po-
pulations evolved the ability to digest lactose after childhood (lactase
persistence). This is why the distribution of lactase persistence across
the globe varies from population to population (Gerbault et al., 2011).
Domesticated animals also brought new diseases, transmitted from
animals to humans, which selected for resistance to microbes to which
hunter-gatherers were never exposed (Crawford, 2009; Greger, 2007).
We will return to niche construction when we discuss human psycho-
logical variation and group differences in cognitive ability below.
There are many other examples of human variation in physical traits
that have been discussed, as noted above, in mainstream textbooks, so
we will not expand on this physical variation further here. The
important point is this: Modern humans likely evolved in East Africa
and then spread across the planet, inhabiting radically diverse en-
vironments, from the lush tropics with moderate weather to harsh
woodlands with hot summers and bleak winters. Because of this, they
evolved slightly different characteristics “suited” to those environ-
ments.
1. Classifying human populations
Most researchers will assent to the above, at least with regard to
physical traits. But they will claim two things that prevent them from
endorsing the full-blown study of human biodiversity. First, they will
claim that human variation is virtually unclassifiable and that concepts
such as race are scientifically misleading and morally pernicious. And
second, they will claim that humans do not vary in psychological traits
or tendencies. We will address the former in this section and the latter
in the next.
Since the 1950s, many intellectuals have assailed the concept of
race, arguing that it is a dangerous fiction and a deeply deceptive
construct that creates an illusion of patterned variation that just does
not match reality (Kaplan & Winther, 2013). Although these skeptical
intellectuals have proposed many arguments against race, the three
most popular are that (1) human variation is almost completely clinal;
(2) human variation is not correlated in a predictable and patterned
way; and (3) human variation between groups is small, probably insig-
nificant, compared to variation within groups. These arguments are ei-
ther factually wrong or true but misleading.
Before looking at these arguments in greater detail, it is worth
noting that one of the most common tactics critics use to argue against
race is to transform it from a reasonable classificatory construct into an
implausible Platonic essence. For example, here is the philosopher
Antony Appiah's (1990) view of what race (or “racialism”) means:
There are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our
species, that allow us to divide human beings into a small set of
races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain
traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with
members of any other race. These traits and tendencies character-
istic of a race constitute, on the racialist view, a sort of racial essence
(pp. 4–5).
This is a common claim, and is related to a rather less philosophical
but equally implausible and essentialist notion recently advanced in a
popular book that race realism is, “at its heart the belief that we are
born different, deep inside our bodies, perhaps even in character and
intellect, as well as in outward appearance” (Saini, 2019, p xiii). It is
unclear what “deep in our bodies” means here: the correct way to state
the hereditarian position would be that human populations on average
vary on psychological traits at least partially because of genes.
Unsurprisingly, those who forward these claims about racial
Platonism rarely include quotations from the supposedly un-
sophisticated thinkers who are dedicated Platonists. That is because
almost none exist among serious scholars today. Even Enlightenment
thinkers such as Kant and Blumenbach, who are often derided today as
archetypal racists crudely obsessed with racial essences, actually as-
serted the opposite. As Smith (2015) noted in his book on the concept of
race in early modern philosophy, “…virtually all explicit claims to the
effect that there is a real, permanent, essential difference between dif-
ferent groups rather than a temporary, reversible, contingent one, are
made by radical free thinkers, such as Voltaire, in the aim of shocking
modern sensibilities, rather than by conservative thinkers aiming to
defend the status quo.” Those who believe that race is a useful construct
are not and have rarely been dedicated to the preposterous proposition
that racial groups are completely different from each other, dis-
tinguished by some kind of unique essence (Sesardic, 2010).
Variation is clinal. This argument contends that human variation is
not discontinuous, but rather gradual as human groups shade into each
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other imperceptibly; therefore, “There are no races, only clines”
(Livingstone & Dobzhansky, 1962, p. 279). Many scientists and philo-
sophers have endorsed this view. There are two retorts. The first is that
even if human variation were completely clinal, researchers could still
classify it without committing some kind of scientific sin Relethford (2009).
Think of age, for example. Variation in age is completely clinal.
Nevertheless, we can and do make useful divisions, for example,
“adolescent,” “middle-aged,” or “elderly.” Furthermore, these classifi-
cations, although somewhat arbitrary at the boundary, contain biolo-
gical information. There really are differences between elderly people
and children. The same holds for human populations. Imagine, for ex-
ample, if variation from Central Africa to Norway were completely
gradual. Norwegians are fair skinned, blond haired, etc., whereas
Africans are dark skinned, black haired, etc. Researchers could still
classify the resulting variation in meaningful ways. Somebody in
southern Norway, for example, would be more similar, on average, to
somebody in northern Norway than to somebody in Central Africa. Of
course, any division will be somewhat arbitrary at the border. When
does an adolescent become an adult? This is the nature of clinal clas-
sifications—but this arbitrariness does not mean that the classification
is completely without justification. And scientists routinely deploy
constructs that use such classifications (e.g., age and color).
The second reply is that variation is not entirely clinal. For example,
genetic variation is structured in such a way that it mostly clusters by
continent of origin of the human population (Rosenberg et al., 2002,
2005).2 Researchers now know that the story of human evolution is
much messier than once believed, with large amounts of branching and
later interbreeding (Reich, 2018). But there is still an underlying pat-
tern to the genetic variation that is not completely gradual–some in-
dividuals consistently group with other individuals in ways that largely
conform to common sense racial classifications (Tang et al., 2005).
Classification is arbitrary because variation is not correlated and pat-
terned. One eloquent and superficially persuasive version of this argu-
ment contends that “There are many different, equally valid procedures
for defining races, and those different procedures yield very different
classifications” (Diamond, 1994, p. 84). According to this, classifica-
tions based on, say, antimalarial genes will be different but equally
legitimate as classifications based on skin color. Scientists can pick
traits on which to categorize humans, sure, but each of the categor-
izations will vary and there is no “real” categorization system to which
scientists can ultimately defer. Therefore, because racial classifications
are arbitrary, scientists should eschew them.
But this argument is tendentious. Researchers do not haphazardly
categorize humans, picking traits at random. In fact, since the
Enlightenment, they have worked sedulously to create classifications
that have explanatory power. Today, researchers care about (1) evo-
lutionary history and shared ancestry, (2) genetic profiles, and (3)
overall phenotypic profiles. A classification scheme that grouped the
Zulu with Icelanders and Norwegians with Northeast Asians would be
puzzling because it would confuse rather than illuminate evolutionary
relationships and patterns of variation. Perhaps more charitably, a
classification scheme that grouped Scandinavians with Nilo-Saharan
speaking ethic groups because both have high rates of lactase persis-
tence might make sense if one is interested only in a single trait. But,
again, it would clearly violate normal principles of classification be-
cause these groups diverged from each other long ago in evolutionary
time, likely evolved the lactase persistence independently, and vary
along many other traits (Check, 2006).
Variation within human populations is much greater than between
human populations. Although this argument is likely older, geneticist
Richard Lewontin (1972) made it famous, announcing that, “Since such
racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or
taxonomic significance either, no justification can be offered for its
continuance.” One still often encounters this argument today. And al-
though the claim about the relative amount of variance is correct, the
contention that racial classification is “of virtually no genetic or taxo-
nomic significance” does not follow. Before examining a more sophis-
ticated argument, consider a simple thought experiment that illustrates
the flaws with this line of thinking. Suppose that every human popu-
lation were exactly the same genetically save for four alleles, which
were unique to each population. Out of 20–25 thousand genes, that is,
only one varied between groups. But, suppose that those alleles had
enormous phenotypic consequences. Allele A made one group four feet
tall, allele B made another group five feet tall, allele C made another six
feet tall, etc. It certainly does not seem as though the resulting genetic
variation would be of no taxonomic significance nor that researchers
should ignore the large genetically caused phenotypic differences (and
their pattern) simply because the underlying genetic variation was
small. Group classification is based both on genotypic and phenotypic
variation and there is no a priori way to know what amount of genetic
variation is important enough to divide into groups.
The argument above suggests that Lewontin's claim is conceptually
flawed. But it is also flawed for another reason: it ignores the effect of
correlated genetic variation (Tal, 2012), which has been dubbed Le-
wontin's fallacy (Edwards, 2003). To make Lewontin's fallacy clear,
consider an analogy. If one looked at the differences between men's and
women's faces by examining one trait at a time (say, comparing eye size
or cheek protrusion), then one would be unable to classify faces into
male or female with a high degree of accuracy. However, if one con-
siders the correlated differences at the same time, then one can classify
human faces into male or female with over 95% accuracy (Bruce et al.,
1993). Roughly speaking, Lewontin did the former instead of the latter
with genetic loci, and concluded that race was of little genetic or
taxonomic significance. However, as the analogy to human faces makes
clear, the significance of human genetic variation, like the significance
of a face or indeed of a language, is in the pattern. If one ignores the
pattern, then one misses the meaning.
To conclude, race is a perfectly reasonable construct that picks out
real patterns of human variation. However, in this article, we will
generally use the term “human population.” The reason for this is quite
frankly to avoid unnecessary contentiousness. “Race” is a charged term
and debates about its appropriateness often distract from more im-
portant debates, such as the nature of human variation. Still, it is crucial
to argue against fallacious or misleading claims about our inability to
classify human variation profitably. Human populations vary in pat-
terned and predictable ways, even if there is no single correct classifi-
cation system. Similarly, cars and trucks, or tables and chairs, vary in
predictable ways, and are categorized together because they share
functional features and overlap on a number of characteristics, not
because there is a single essential feature associated with different kinds
of vehicles or furniture. For example, we do not reject the idea that a
Tesla is a car simply because it has an electric motor rather than the
more traditional internal combustion engine. And we do not find a
three-legged table perplexing simply because most tables have either
four legs or one.3
In classifying people, we can start with broad continental popula-
tions: Africans, Asians, Europeans, Americans, and Oceanianins,4 and
then move to more granular analyses as scientific interests change,
recognizing that large continental categories may lack the precision
2 In fact, Rosenberg's results match fairly closely with Blumenbach's classifi-
cations.
3 See Wittgenstein's (1957) discussion of “family resemblances.”
4 There is a large amount of genetic diversity in Africa, so it is important to
bear in mind that broad continental racial categories are quite crude, and
perhaps they are not scientifically useful. That is an empirical question.
However, it is clear that such classifications are not arbitrary. We wait further
evidence and argumentation to make strong conclusions about the most useful
classifications of human diversity.
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required to make scientific progress on a number of puzzles of human
variation. Although some may bemoan this, wondering why there are
not “objectively” correct classifications, it is nothing unique to human
variation. Theorists in biology have long been divided into “lumpers”
and “splitters” and have argued sometimes vociferously about how to
classify species and subspecies (Endersby, 2009).5
2. Psychological variation
As noted in the introductory section, most scholars accept that
human populations vary physically, and mainstream textbooks discuss
human variation openly without receiving derision or blowback
(Molnar, 2006); however, few scholars openly accept that human po-
pulations vary psychologically (Winegard, Winegard & Boutwell, 2017).
This position appears intellectually indefensible, because the brain is
not somehow impervious to selective forces. Rather, it is an organ like
any other and therefore is just as susceptible to evolutionary pressures
as is the skin, lungs, or digestive system. For this reason, some have
called the view that human populations do not vary psychologically
“liberal creationism” or “selective dualism,” because it relies upon the
implausible assumption that human psychological propensities were
not selected for by different environments, niches, and climates in the
past 50,000 years.
Although it may seem unfair to label a view “liberal creationism,”
there is strong evidence that self-described liberals are more likely than
conservatives to reject scientific evidence of group differences on
ideological grounds (Clark & Winegard, in press). In fact, some oppo-
nents of the hereditarian hypothesis have argued that “it is a matter of
ethical principle that individual and cultural accomplishment is not tied
to the genes in the same way as the appearance of our hair”
(Turkheimer, 2007). Others have suggested silence or double standards
or even deception when dealing with ideas and evidence about popu-
lation differences in socially valued traits. According to this view, when
our ethical ideals conflict with the scientific evidence, we should
prioritize our ethical ideals over scientific conclusions. The view that
we should tell “noble lies” when we think the truth would poison social
relations is at least as old as Plato's Republic. While we reject the con-
tention that widespread belief in the hereditarian hypothesis would
have bad ethical consequences (Anomaly & Winegard, 2020), it is
worth emphasizing that even if telling lies about socially consequential
topics is sometimes justifiable on moral grounds, this does not change
the fact that they are lies, which generally counts as a consideration
against them (Anomaly, 2017).
What is perhaps more perplexing than the fact that many main-
stream psychologists dismiss the notion that human populations vary
psychologically is that some evolutionary psychologists do as well
(Winegard & Winegard, 2014). Some of the most prominent members of
the discipline, for example, have argued that any non-sexed linked
psychological differences among human populations are caused either
by stochastic processes or by pleiotropic genetic effects
(Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). That is,
according to this line of argumentation, there is a panhuman nature and
any deviations from it are largely irrelevant noise. The arguments used
to defend this position have, we believe, been refuted (or significantly
weakened) by recent developments in genetics and human evolutionary
analysis. And because many who dispute the fruitfulness of hereditar-
ianism also rely upon them, it is worth examining them in detail.
The most common is that there has just been too little evolutionary
time for human psychology to change from 50,000 years ago, because it
takes many thousands of years to create new adaptations—new mental
mechanisms, in this case; therefore, modern human skulls still house
“stone age” brains (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005, p 57). But this misframes
the actual debate. The claim that hereditarians and others who believe
in the importance of human psychological diversity advocate is not that
some human groups have radically different mental adaptations from
other groups, but rather that they have slightly different distributions of
psychological traits that all humans share. Consider an analogy. There
is a basic design for guitars. They have a body, a neck, a bridge, a
fretboard, and six strings (for this example, at least). So, there is in some
sense a “guitar nature.” However, small, correlated differences in guitar
parts can lead to nontrivial differences in sound. Slightly different
textured strings coupled with a slightly larger sound hole might lead to
a more resonant, even plangent sound, even though the difference be-
tween that guitar and others is quite small. The same holds for human
psychological traits. Small correlated differences in the brain might
cause one group to be slightly more self-controlled, intelligent, ambi-
tious, or aggressive than another (Winegard et al., 2017).
Another argument that is sometimes advanced is that humans
evolved to be flexible and therefore did not need to respond to selection
pressures psychologically because they could respond to them cultu-
rally. Undoubtedly, humans are uniquely cultural animals, with re-
markably flexible behavioral repertoires (Baumeister, 2005). However,
there is absolutely no evidence that they somehow evolved just the
perfect amount of behavioral flexibility in Africa some 150,000 years
ago such that all their descendants would never evolve slightly different
psychological propensities. And, in fact, there is a lot of evidence to the
contrary (Wade, 2014). Different environments and cultural systems
likely selected for subtle differences in psychological proclivities just as
they did for physical traits. Moreover, among primates it is clear that the
comparative advantage of humans is the capacity to cooperate with
large numbers of people (Bowles & Gintis, 2013; Turchin, 2015), to
learn through cultural transmission (Henrich, 2016; Mesoudi, 2016),
and to trade with strangers (Ridley, 2010). This requires humans to
make plans, to develop a theory of mind, and to decipher who is
trustworthy. Different environments, some of which are culturally
constructed, will tend to select for different cognitive abilities and
propensities. Therefore, the brain is an especially important target of
natural selection in humans.
For one example, because of differences in climate and environ-
mental harshness and later in staple agricultural crop, it is possible that
Northeast Asians had to cooperate more than some other groups to
survive and reproduce effectively—or, put slightly differently, those
who cooperated more in their societies had higher fitness than those
who did not (Kitayama, King, Hsu, Liberzon, & Yoon, 2016). And
therefore, Northeast Asians have subtle, but noticeable and measurable
shifts in personality traits that make them, on average, more co-
operative and collectivistic. From this perspective, it is not a historical
and cultural accident that Northeast Asians are more collectivistic than
other populations (Markus & Kitayama, 2010). Rather, for evolutionary
reasons, they are slightly more sensitive to social disapproval and so-
litude than other groups, and this leads them to create cultural systems
that emphasize social harmony and belongingness (Chiao &
Blizinsky, 2010; Way & Lieberman, 2010). These cultural systems are
like the niches discussed in the introductory section, and they also exert
selective pressures on the people who inhabit them. Therefore there is a
feedback system such that slightly different personality traits among
human populations lead to the creation of slightly different cultures,
which then select, both culturally and genetically, for different traits.
It seems rather likely that we would have many more examples if
researchers invested more time and resources into searching for them.
As it stands, there are suggestions that some European groups exhibit
more individualistic, trusting, and pro-social behavior—especially a
willingness to follow impersonal rules, and punish rule violators—be-
cause of a persistent difference in marriage patterns (Frost, 2017) and a
deliberate loosening of kin-based institutions by the Catholic Church
(Schulz, Bahrami-Rad, Beauchamp, & Henrich, 2019); that Western
5 For example, some biologists think of a species as a population that can
produce fertile offspring, while other biologists consider animals within the
same genus that have similar traits a species, even if they cannot produce fertile
offspring.
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Europeans are more pacific (and less aggressive) than they used to be
even 1000 years ago because of an extensive use of the death penalty
for violent crimes by Western States (Frost & Harpending, 2015); and
that societies farther from the equator tend to be more monogamous
and cooperative because paternal provisioning became more important
the farther from the equator a human population spread (Miller, 1994)
among other suggestions. The point here is not that all of these hy-
potheses are correct, but simply that they are plausible, productive, and
fruitful and should spur more research.
3. Group differences in cognitive ability
Perhaps the greatest refusal to grapple honestly with Darwin's le-
gacy appears in the divisive debate about the etiology of group differ-
ences in intelligence (Rushton, 1999).6 Those who argue that genetics
at least partially explain the Black-White IQ gap—and other disparities
in cognitive ability among human populations more broadly—have
been assailed for their supposed moral depravity and many if not most
intellectuals publicly refuse even to consider the possibility that genes
could play any role in group differences in cognitive ability
(Cofnas, 2016; Winegard & Winegard, 2015). People seem to feel as
though it is racist simply to hypothesize that groups might differ on a
trait as socially valued as intelligence, although this is a fallacy that
scholars should reject (Carl, 2018).
Before digging into specific hypotheses about group differences in
cognitive ability, hypotheses that are incendiary and cause immediate
and visceral resistance, it is probably better to ask a more abstract
question: Could populations differ, on average, in cognitive ability be-
cause of evolutionary processes? Here, it seems difficult to deny that
they could. Cognitive ability is “visible to selection” and is as amenable
to evolutionary change as any other trait. Some have contended that
because it is caused by many, many genes (i.e., is polygenic), cognitive
ability is unlikely to have changed significantly in the last 50,000 years,
but this is simply incorrect. Animal breeders select for polygenic traits
without issue. And other polygenic traits, such as height, have likely
been changed by natural selection in human populations in the past
45,000 years (Reich, 2018; Savolainen, Lascoux & Merilä, 2013). The
only empirical question, then, is not could groups differ in cognitive
ability at least partially because of genes, but do they.
Indeed, Charles Darwin (1876) wondered whether recent evolution
might have produced cognitive differences that help explain the relative
prosperity of different societies:
It is most difficult to say why one civilised nation rises, becomes
more powerful, and spreads more widely, than another; or why the
same nation progresses more at one time than at another. We can
only say that it depends on an increase in the actual number of the
population, on the number of men endowed with high intellectual
and moral faculties, as well as on their standard of excellence (p.
140).
Although we think the well-documented black-white IQ gap is no
more interesting than other cognitive differences between groups, we
focus on it to illustrate our view because more has been written about
this cognitive difference than many others (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994;
Rushton & Jensen, 2005).7 Our purpose is not to argue exhaustively in
favor of hereditarianism, but rather to situate its arguments and hy-
potheses into a broader evolutionary view of humans and point to the
strong theoretical plausibility and scientific fruitfulness of hereditarianism.
There is a roughly one standard deviation (15-point) IQ gap be-
tween American Whites and Blacks, which is itself not a matter of
dispute (Murray, 2007; Roth, Bevier, Bobko, Switzer III & Tyler, 2001).
Here, for example, are quotes from two of the most popular textbooks
on intelligence: “There is some variation in the results, but not a great
deal. The African American means [on intelligence tests] are about one
standard deviation unit…below the White means…” (Hunt, 2010, p.
411). And “It should be acknowledged, then, without further ado that
there is a difference in average IQ between blacks and whites in the
USA and Britain” (Mackintosh, 2011, p. 334). Some researchers do
contend that this gap has narrowed across the 20th century (Dickens &
Flynn, 2006), but others dispute this, and it seems reasonable, given the
preponderance of evidence, to suppose that the gap remains roughly
one standard deviation.
When grappling with a problem as complicated as the etiology of
group differences in cognitive ability, no one piece of evidence will
conclusively support one causal theory over another. Instead, re-
searchers have to assess a body of empirical evidence and its relation to
prior theory to estimate which causal account is more probable
(Lipton, 2004; Urbach, 1974). Broadly speaking, there are two research
traditions that organize data and exploration about the causes of group
differences in cognitive ability: the hereditarian tradition and the en-
vironmentalist tradition. To simplify, research traditions are programs
in which scientists largely share similar assumptions about specific
causal forces and use those assumptions to try to solve various em-
pirical puzzles.8 The hereditarian tradition hypothesizes, inter alia, that
a significant proportion of difference between Black and Whites in
cognitive ability is caused by genetics, whereas the environmentalist
tradition hypothesizes that almost all of the difference is caused by
environmental and cultural forces (Nisbett et al., 2012). In what fol-
lows, we will point to a few pieces of evidence that support hereditarian
hypotheses, then we will situate the hereditarian hypotheses into the
broader Darwinian theory of population variation that we laid out
above.
High heritability of intelligence within groups. Heritability is a measure
of how much of the variance in a trait in a particular environment is
caused by differences in genes (Turkheimer, 2000). Cognitive ability is
one of the most highly heritable psychological traits, often exceeding
70% in adult samples—meaning that 70% of the variance in in-
telligence (measured by IQ tests) is caused by differences in genes
(Bouchard, 2013). Many scholars have argued, correctly as far as it
goes, that one cannot uncritically infer that within-group heritability
applies to between-group heritability; that is, just because much of the
proportion of within-group variation in intelligence is caused by dif-
ferences in genes, it does not mean that between-group variation is
(Sesardic, 2000). However, the contention that within-group herit-
ability is not at least suggestive of causes of between-group differences
is wrong—especially if some other knowledge is added. High within-
group heritability does not ipso facto mean that between-group varia-
tion is caused by genes; but it does make it more plausible
6 There is, of course, a huge literature that debates the validity of IQ tests, and
we do not have time to discuss it in detail here. But the literature unequivocally
demonstrates that IQ is predictive of a host of important life outcomes, ranging
from wealth and educational attainment to health, relationship stability, and
even criminality. For an influential view on how to define intelligence, see
Gottfredson (1997). For an overview of life outcomes associated with in-
telligence (as measured by IQ), see Ritchie (2015) and Plomin and von
Stumm (2018).
7 The reason for this focus is clearly that in the American context in the 20th
century, Blacks and Whites were the two main demographic populations until
(footnote continued)
quite recently.
8 See Laudan (1978) for a discussion of research traditions; and compare to
Kuhn's idea of paradigms, Kuhn (1970). Although a thorough discussion of
these concepts is beyond the scope of this paper, notice that our use of “research
tradition” is different from Laudan's, because in our usage it is an explanatory
framework that makes hypotheses (e.g., it predicts that part of the variation in
humans and among human populations is caused by genes). Lauden considered
Darwinism a research tradition, but likely would not have considered heredi-
tarianism one. We use the term to describe both, because we believe that
hereditarianism shares enough similarities with the basic concept of “research
tradition” to justify the expansion of the concept.
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(Jensen, 1998).
One of the most famous arguments about the dangers of uncritically
applying within-group heritability to between-group differences was
made by Richard Lewontin (1970). Readers are to imagine a corn seed
that is planted into pots containing two soils of different quality—call
them soils A (fecund) and B (impoverished). And now imagine that the
plant height varies a bit inside each pot, but varies drastically between
pots (say, five inches in the impoverished and 15 inches in the fecund).
Variation within each pot, if the pots are tightly controlled by experi-
menters, will be 100% genetic because there is no environmental var-
iation. However, variation between the pots will be entirely environ-
mental. Therefore, even though plant height is nearly 100% heritable
within groups, it is nearly 0% heritable between groups. This example
certainly shows that high within-group heritability does not imply that
there is high between-group heritability. But there are several reasons
that this observation is not a strong argument against the hereditarian
hypothesis.
First, as noted by Lewontin himself, tweaking the example slightly
allows it to show that a within-group heritability of 50% (or 0% even) is
completely consistent with a between group heritability of 100%. So,
suppose that both pots are filled with the same soil and that two kinds
of seeds, red and green, are thrown in randomly. The red seeds lead to
plants that are 13 inches tall on average, and the green seeds lead to
plants that are 17 inches tall on average. Suppose now that the plants
vary randomly in height around their means because of subtle devia-
tions in sunlight and soil quality; and therefore, the heritability of
height within each color is 50%. However, when researchers calculate
the respective means for each group, the environmental variance can-
cels out, and all that is left is the between-group genetic variation.
Second, the example almost certainly does not pertain to the Black-
White gap. It is difficult to argue that Blacks and Whites inhabit com-
pletely different, but uniform environments—that is, it is unlikely that
there is some X-factor that affects all Blacks but no Whites
(Jensen, 1998; Warne, 2020). One might immediately object. Surely
Blacks face ubiquitous discrimination, which Whites do not face? The
claim that Blacks face ubiquitous prejudice and discrimination in the
contemporary United States is more often repeated then experimentally
demonstrated. Blacks certainly might face some discrimination, but we
are skeptical that it is as pervasive as is often claimed (see
Boutwell et al., 2017; Zigerell, 2018). Still, to be charitable to the dis-
crimination argument, it is not entirely unreasonable to suppose that if
prejudice were widespread, this could conceivably affect cognitive
performance, and certainly some evidence suggests that there is pre-
judice, perhaps sometimes subtle, against Blacks in the United States
and elsewhere (Pearson, Dovidio & Gaertner, 2009)
Nevertheless, even if discrimination against Blacks in some coun-
tries is widespread, this would not explain IQ and achievement gaps
between ethnically homogenous countries, such as Iceland and Haiti, or
between different demographic groups within multi-ethnic countries in
which racial discrimination is not widespread, such as the UK, France,
or Sweden. Moreover, the claim that discrimination depresses in-
telligence must specify some causal mechanism that also affects other
ethnic groups which suffer discrimination. As the prominent en-
vironmentalist James Flynn (1980) put it:
Racism is not some magic force that operates without a chain of
causality. Racism harms people because of its effects and when we
list those effects, lack of confidence, low self-image, emasculation of
the male, the welfare mother home, poverty, it seems absurd to
claim that any one of them does not vary significantly within both
black and white America (pp. 59–60).
As within-group heritability increases, the size of the environmental
variance effect needed to explain between-group differences increases
substantially. For example, if the adult within-group heritability is 70%,
which seems like a fair estimate, then the Black-White environmental
effect difference would need to be 1.82 standard deviations to explain
the IQ gap (Sesardic, 2005). Our argument here, then, is not that dis-
crimination arguments are completely erroneous, but that prejudice,
systematic discrimination, and other commonly forwarded environ-
mental variables likely cannot explain the entire IQ gap and therefore
that the comparison to the plants with a zero percent genetic con-
tribution to between-groups differences is almost certainly inapplicable
to the Black-White IQ gap.
Now, to see that it is reasonable to extrapolate from within-group
heritability to between group causes, consider the following. Imagine
that we found that the heritability within a group of speaking a parti-
cular language is roughly 0% because the variance is entirely en-
vironmentally caused. Would that inform hypotheses about the causes
of group differences in language spoken? It certainly seems as though
researchers would and should presume that the between-group varia-
tion is substantially environmental, unless evidence strongly contra-
dicted that hypothesis. And it seems as though the obverse should hold
as well. The heritability of height, for example, is quite high within-
groups; therefore, it is eminently reasonable to assume, as most re-
searchers do, that at least some of the between-group variation in
height is genetic. For example, even before researchers had strong ge-
netic evidence, they assumed and hypothesized that African Pygmy
groups were shorter than other populations because of differences in
their genes (Jelenkovic et al., 2016). This hypothesis is likely correct
(Pemberton et al., 2018) and might be driven by selection for a different
life history (LH) strategy and the tradeoffs that entailed
(Migliano, Vinicius & Lahr, 2007), although some research has sug-
gested that LH differences might be a pleiotropic effect of selection
specifically for height (Lopez et al., 2019). This does not mean that such
assumptions are infallible. Rather, it just means that they are useful
starting points—reasonable priors—that should be updated after fur-
ther empirical exploration.
To repeat, high within-group heritability does not automatically
mean that between-group variation is caused even partially by genetics.
But we think the pattern of between-group variation in psychological
traits that we see around the world is best explained by the hereditarian
hypothesis. Hereditarianism is more parsimonious than en-
vironmentalism because it posits that, in most cases, the same causal
processes that cause within-group variation also cause between group
variation.
Global distribution of IQ. Although researchers have focused most
intensively on differences between Blacks and Whites in cognitive
ability, data on IQ scores are now global and suggest many interesting
differences among populations (Becker & Rindermann, 2016; Lynn &
Vanhanen, 2012). For example, many studies have found that Northeast
Asians (IQ = 103–106) and Ashkenazi Jews (IQ = 110–115) score
higher than Northern Europeans and higher than Caucasians more
generally (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Hunt, 2010; Jensen, 1998;
Wade, 2014). These studies are interesting because they suggest a
broader pattern of human population differences in cognitive ability.
They also cast doubt on at least some unsophisticated environmentalist
explanations of the Black-White gap, which hold that purely social
forces like persecution or privilege explain the relevant gaps. An ob-
vious explanation for the Black-White IQ gap, as we noted, is that in
some countries Blacks have faced persistent discrimination and that
such discrimination has diminished their phenotypic IQ. However, Jews
have also faced persistent discrimination, and yet have the highest IQ of
any ethnic group in the world.9 Of course, the patterns of discrimina-
tion that Blacks and Jews faced are quite different, so there are pre-
judice-based explanations that are still salvageable. But this example
9 According to one view, Ashkenazi Jews have a high IQ in part because for
about 1,000 years they were excluded from entering some occupations, and
confined to working in cognitively demanding occupations like banking, from
which Christians abstained for religious reasons (Hardy, Cochran, and
Harpending 2006).
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does point out that a straightforward “discrimination-depresses-IQ ar-
gument” is not tenable. It also adds an important data point that en-
vironmentalists struggle to explain, but which is perfectly explicable
from the hereditarian perspective.
Global results have also shown that the IQ of Sub-Saharan Africans
is roughly 7510 (Rinderman, 2013). This needs to be qualified, because
substantial debate surrounds the estimate. First, some scholars insist
that tests created largely by Europeans are necessarily biased against
non-Western people (Nell, 2000). However, this is contradicted by the
high scores of Northeast Asians and by the fact that IQ tests are pre-
dictively valid in Africa (Owen, 1992). The next source of contention is
the score of the true genotypic estimate. Lynn and Meisenberg
(2010a,b) argued that it was closer to 70; Wicherts, Dolan and van der
Maas (2010) argued that it was closer to 80; and recently,
Rindermann (2013) estimated that it was around 75. The Rindermann
estimate, in absence of other evidence, strikes us as the most reason-
able. We do, however, recognize that Flynn effects may occur, raising
African IQ at least a few points in the coming decades; therefore, our
suggestion is not that the current African phenotypic average IQ is
concordant with their genotypic potential.
Blacks in the United States trace most of their ancestry to Western
Africa, but are somewhere between 15–25% admixed with Europeans
(Baharian et al., 2016; Bryc, Durand, Macpherson, Reich & Mountain,
2015). Thus, an 85 estimate of the mean IQ of Blacks in the United
States is consistent with a roughly 75 IQ of Sub-Saharan Africans.
Furthermore, these broad population patterns are consistent across the
globe, with each group performing roughly similarly across multiple
countries (Rushton & Jensen, 2010).
Transracial adoption. Although there is substantial debate about the
meaning of the results of transracial adoption studies, the single best
such study, the Minnesota Transracial Adoption Study (MTRAS), re-
ported by Scarr and Weinberg (1976) and Weinberg, Scarr and
Waldman (1992) comports well with hereditarian predictions. In this
study, children of two White parents, one White and one Black parent,
and two Black parents were adopted into middle class White homes.
When the adoptees were seven years old, the children of two White
parents scored 117.6, the mixed scored 109.5, and the children of two
black parents scored 95.4. In a 10-year follow up, the respective IQs
were 105.6, 98.5, and 89.4. The results of this study, of course, are
perfectly explicable by the hereditarian research tradition. And al-
though there are several reasonable criticisms of the hereditarian in-
terpretation of the MTRAS, a wholly environmental explanation of its
results appears much less parsimonious than one that includes genetic
causation (Rushton & Jensen, 2005; but see, Thomas, 2017).
Furthermore, other studies with East Asian children, although
likewise disputed (Thomas, 2017), also support the hereditarian posi-
tion. For example, Clark and Hanisee (1982) reported results from a
study in which 25 four-year olds from Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, and
Thailand were adopted into White families and scored 120 (112–114
with Flynn effect correction) on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test,
despite that 16 were reported to be malnourished at some time in their
infancy.11 This study, it should be noted, provides ambiguous support
for hereditarianism because 17 of the children were Southeast Asians,
from nationalities with IQs lower than 100 according to recent esti-
mates and therefore, at least some of these effects are likely related to
well-known adoption gains (e.g., Kendler, Turkheimer, Ohlsson,
Sundquist & Sundquist, 2015). In another study Frydman and
Lynn (1989) reported on 19 Koreans who were adopted into Belgian
families. They found that the children had a mean IQ of 118 on the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) and that correcting for
IQ gains, the Korean children had a roughly 10-point advantage over
native Belgian children (see also, Dalen et al., 2008). And in another
study of 87 Chinese girls adopted by Dutch families, Finet, Vermeer,
Juffer, Bijttebier and Bosmans (2019) found remarkable cognitive
“catch-up” nine years after their adoptions such that they had a mean
fluid IQ of 109.11 at age 10.
None of the evidence for hereditarianism listed here or in any other
article is, of course, dispositive. But the hereditarian research tradition
explains all of these data remarkably well. Because it posits that in-
tellectual potential is influenced by genes that vary among populations,
it predicts that, unless environments are wildly different, human groups
will score reasonably similarly wherever they happen to reside.
Furthermore, it predicts that they will also score reasonably similarly
when adopted, even if into different socioeconomic or racial families
from their own. The environmentalist research tradition, on the other
hand, is confronted with many difficulties that require ad hoc hy-
potheses to explain. It begins with a bold theory: All human groups are
roughly the same in intellectual potential, and, therefore, any popula-
tion differences are caused by environmental or cultural forces.
However, this bold claim is constantly assaulted by counterevidence
that the environmentalists struggle to explain, especially compared to
the ease of explanation offered by the hereditarian. The global pattern
of IQ differences, for example, appears more difficult for an en-
vironmentalist to explain than an hereditarian. And so does the general
persistence of demographic behavioral patterns across time and space.
And so do other patterns in cognitive ability that are less often dis-
cussed in the literature, such as the high IQ scores of Ashkenazi Jews
and Northeast Asians, even when they are adopted by White Christian
families in North America and Europe (Finet et al., 2019; Hernnstein &
Murray, 1994). It is not the case, of course, that explanations are im-
possible to forward from an environmentalist perspective; it is simply
that they are more difficult to forward than from an hereditarian per-
spective and end up looking more like ad hoc hypotheses than fruitful
predictions or parsimonious causal narratives.
Last, the hereditarian research tradition, as we will argue, is much
more consistent with the single most powerful tradition in biology and
psychology: Darwinism. As we have noted throughout, human popu-
lation variation in both physical and psychological traits follows
straightforwardly from Darwin's theories of natural and sexual selec-
tion. The hereditarian research tradition, as we see it, is a straightfor-
ward extension of the Darwinian tradition and makes the same basic
scientific assumptions: humans are the products of natural and sexual
selection; individuals vary in heritable traits; groups vary in heritable
traits; intelligence is an adaptation; humans vary in intelligence; human
groups vary in intelligence (Rushton, 1999). An environmentalist re-
search tradition does not, of course, entirely contradict Darwinism, so
far as we can tell, but it is not so obviously congruent with it as is
hereditarianism. Moreover, researchers now know that genes and cul-
tures co-evolve; therefore, offering an environmental explanation is
often in part a way of revealing a potentially genetic one. Sometimes
genes create bodies that sculpt environments in ways that increase their
proliferation (Dawkins, 1982), just as environments—especially social
norms—affect which genes find their way into future bodies
(Henrich, 2016).
Researchers who are keen to unite the hereditarian tradition to
Darwinism have forwarded several plausible hypotheses about the
causes of group differences in cognitive ability. The broadest and most
general of these is called cold winters theory (Lynn, 2015; Frost, 2019;
Rushton, 1995). This theory proposes that harsher and more variable
environments such as those further from the equator would likely have
selected for more intelligence. The proposal is not that cold weather
somehow makes people smart, but rather that the attendant problems
of surviving and reproducing in environments with long, cold winters
10 It is worth noting that there might be variation in IQ across Sub-Saharan
Africa because there is a large amount of genetic diversity in Africa. We do not
mean to suggest here that Sub-Saharan African forms one group that is largely
homogenous.
11 It is important emphasize that the heritability of IQ scores increases sub-
stantially across age, moving from well below 50% in childhood to nearly 80%
in adulthood.
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which require long-term planning may tend to select for traits like
higher intelligence and lower time preference relative to other en-
vironments. Food, for example, might be prevalent in the moderate
months, but becomes scarce in winters, forcing inhabitants to hunt and
fish game and/or to preserve food from the more fruitful seasons
(Berbesque, Marlowe, Shaw & Thompson, 2014). Some scholars have
argued that the important thing about distance from the equator is
environmental novelty (Kanazawa, 2004; 2012).
Although cold winters theory is sometimes mocked for being silly or
simplistic or for being unhelpfully speculative (McGreal, 2012), similar
hypotheses are routinely forwarded in the literature about non-human
animals. For example, researchers have explored the brain size-en-
vironmental change hypothesis in a number of species. The main idea is
that animals that encounter harsher environments are confronted with
greater obstacles to obtaining reliable food supplies, and thus that
harsher environments sometimes select for enhanced cognitive capa-
cities (Roth, Gallagher, LaDage & Pravosudov, 2012; Sol, Bacher,
Reader & Lefebvre, 2008). Although the results are somewhat mixed,
evidence more or less supports some variant of this hypothesis
(Maklakov, Immler, Gonzalez-Voyer, Rönn & Kolm, 2011; Morand-
Ferron, Hermer, Jones & Thompson, 2019); and inarguably it has
spurred scholarship and creative hypothesizing (Kanazawa, 2008; Sayol
et al., 2018), as well as constructive criticism (Wicherts, Borsboom &
Dolan, 2010).
Other researchers have proposed slightly different ideas.
Rushton (1985) famously argued that different environments selected
for different life-history (LH) strategies, with Africans possessing the
fastest LH because they evolved in an unpredictable environment and
Asians, the slowest because they evolved in a harsh, but predictable
environment. From this view, intelligence is just one among many LH
traits that vary in a correlated manner among human populations.
These include aggression, age of maturation, and impulsivity
(Meisenberg & Woodley, 2013). Others suggest a different explanation
for these correlated phenotypic traits: the amount of paternal provi-
sioning required varies such that more is needed the further from the
equator a population lives (Miller, 1994). As a group's diet consists
more of hunted (or fished) food, the proportion of calories women
provide decreases; therefore, women become more dependent on men
for calories for their children and can no longer “gene shop” re-
productively by having more sexual relationships with relatively un-
committed men. Instead, they must form more exclusive bonds with
men who will provide calories for the children (Marlowe, 2003). And
this, according to Miller, likely selected for a suite of traits that look
similar to Rushton's LH traits (less impulsivity, lower libido, etc.).
These theories likely are not enough to explain differences in cog-
nitive ability among modern humans and therefore need to be supple-
mented with other theories, most importantly with some kind of niche
construction theory (Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman, 2000). We dis-
cussed niche construction in the introduction. Here, the crucial point is
that some niches can and likely did select for intelligence in humans.
For example, many theories of human intelligence posit that social
competition was a chief driver (Bailey & Geary, 2009). These theories
appear limited and unable to grapple with some data, but, if expanded
into a broader cultural theory of intelligence, one that posits that in-
telligence evolved to allow humans to flourish in complicated and often
competitive cultures, they likely work well (Muthukrishna, Doebeli,
Chudek & Henrich, 2018; Van Schaik, Isler & Burkart, 2012). Culture, a
human niche, creates selective pressures on human intelligence because
it rewards those who are cognitively sophisticated enough to learn ra-
pidly and to innovate (Clark, 2009). From this perspective, cold winters
may have selected for human intelligence, but then culture, especially
after the invention of agriculture, did as well, significantly augmenting
it in some cases (Cochran, Hardy & Harpending, 2009; Haidt, 2009).
None of these theories is as powerful and persuasive as, say,
Newton's theory of gravitation, but that is the nature of evolutionary
biology (Hull, 1974). Physics and chemistry are often more certain and
more precise than biology or psychology will ever be. And many the-
ories in evolutionary biology and psychology will remain speculative
and tentative until more genetic and archeological evidence is avail-
able. Despite this, such theories and hypotheses nevertheless should
shift the priors of an honest and open scholar. Our belief is that the
hereditarian research tradition is fully consonant with a broader Dar-
winian tradition that has been remarkably successful and best explains
current data; therefore, it should be widely accepted until and unless
researchers in the environmentalist tradition produce data that strongly
contradict it or point to specific puzzles their research tradition can
solve that hereditarianism cannot. Nevertheless, it is important to be
humble and to accept the limitations of the current evidence. Specific
hypotheses proposed by the hereditarian research tradition seem to us
much more plausible than those proposed by the environmentalist
tradition. Hereditarianism also seems more fruitful and capable of
solving important problems about human variation. However, our
current understanding of longstanding puzzles about human evolution
is limited, and even ostensibly simple puzzles such as the causes of skin
color variance among human populations have not been entirely
solved. It is unlikely that we will solve the puzzle of the causes of
variation in human intelligence anytime soon. Our contention is not
that hereditarians have the final answers. Rather, it is that the heredi-
tarian research tradition seems best equipped to provide such answers,
has forwarded fruitful hypotheses, and is perfectly congruent with
Darwinism.
Before concluding, it is worth asking why so many social scientists
adamantly refuse to consider the hereditarian hypothesis, as well as the
broader hereditarian research tradition, despite that it is often more
fruitful than the environmentalist alternative. It is hard to escape the
conclusion that most of the resistance is driven by ideological and not
scientific concerns. Many scholars and journalists are “equalitarians”
who are strongly predisposed to believe that all demographic groups
are equal on all socially valued traits (Garrett, 1961; Gottfredson, 1994;
Winegard & Winegard, 2015; Winegard, Clark, Hasty & Baumeister,
2019).
Many scholars, it seems, believe that race and IQ is a toxic topic and
possibly even dangerous to study. For a long, long time, they have at
least tacitly endorsed a regime of silence, a kind of quiet noble lie, and
have punished those who violated this regime ferociously. But, if the
goal of science is to discover the truth, then the only option scientists
have is to pursue it even if it might lead to conclusions that challenge
sacred narratives. Unlike momentary sensibilities, the truth is im-
mutable, and in almost all cases, the costs of a lie outweigh the costs of
truth. One cost of a lie is misinformation. Today, many believe that the
overwhelming consensus of reputable scientists is that some variant of
an environmental explanation for persistent IQ differences among
groups is almost certainly correct. But this is wrong. And getting the
answer wrong can invite costly social policies that are likely to fail, as
well as create inter-group hostility when people notice that groups
systematically behave differently even in similar circumstances
(Cofnas, 2020; Murray, 2020). Among experts, hereditarianism is
widely respected and endorsed (Rindermann, Becker, & Coyle, 2016).
And even those experts who believe that it is ultimately wrong, gen-
erally agree that it is a reasonable research tradition that should be
treated with scientific respect and confronted with debate and evi-
dence, not moral accusations (Flynn, 1980).
4. Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that the modern orthodoxy about
group differences in cognitive ability is almost certainly incorrect and
has stultified research. Specifically, we argued that (1) humans popu-
lations vary; (2) such variation can be classified; (3) they almost cer-
tainly vary psychologically; and (4) they also almost certainly vary in
cognitive ability. These assertions follow straightforwardly from
Darwinian considerations. For too long, scholars have attempted to
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dodge some of these almost inevitable consequences of Darwinism,
either ignoring psychological variation among human populations or
actively arguing that it does not exist. This appears misguided and
untenable. The hereditarian hypothesis that at least part of IQ differ-
ences among human populations, like differences in other psychological
traits, are caused by genetics, seems to us the most plausible hypothesis
for the cause of persistent cognitive differences. And the hereditarian
research tradition seems the most powerful and fruitful in the game of
human variation right now. It is consistent with everything we know
about biology and best explains the available data. Although there
might be another, better research tradition waiting to form, we will not
know until we begin to discuss these topics openly, honestly, and ju-
diciously.
References
Anomaly, J. (2017). Race research and the ethics of belief. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry,
14, 287–297.
Anomaly, J., & Winegard, B. (2020). The egalitarian fallacy: Are group differences
compatible with political liberalism? Philosophia. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-
019-00129-w.
Appiah, K. A. (1990). Racisms. In D. T. Goldberg (Ed.). Anatomy of racism (pp. 3–17).
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Bae, C. J., Douka, K., & Petraglia, M. D. (2017). On the origin of modern humans: Asian
perspectives. Science (New York, N.Y.), 358, 1269.
Baharian, S., Barakatt, M., Gignoux, C. R., Shringarpure, S., Errington, J., & Blot, W. J.
(2016). The great migration and african-american genomic diversity. PLoS genetics,
12, e1006059.
Bailey, D. H., & Geary, D. C. (2009). Hominid brain evolution. Human Nature, 20, 67–79.
Baumeister, R. F. (2005). The cultural animal: Human nature, meaning, and social life. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Becker, D., & Rindermann, H. (2016). The relationship between cross-national genetic
distances and IQ-differences. Personality and Individual Differences, 98, 300–310.
Berbesque, J. C., Marlowe, F. W., Shaw, P., & Thompson, P. (2014). Hunter–gatherers
have less famine than agriculturalists. Biology Letters, 10, 20130853.
Bigham, A. W. (2016). Genetics of human origin and evolution: High-altitude adapta-
tions. Current Opinion in Genetics & Development, 41, 8–13.
Bouchard, T. J. (2013). The wilson effect: The increase in heritability of iq with age. Twin
Research and Human Genetics, 16, 923–930.
Boutwell, B. B., Nedelec, J. L., Winegard, B., Shackelford, T., Beaver, K. M., Vaughn, M.,
et al. (2017). The prevalence of discrimination across racial groups in contemporary
america: Results from a nationally representative sample of adults. PloS one, 12(8),
e0183356.
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2013). A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bruce, V., Burton, A. M., Hanna, E., Healey, P., Mason, O., & Coombes, A. (1993). Sex
discrimination: How do we tell the difference between male and female faces?
Perception, 22, 131–152.
Bryc, K., Durand, E. Y., Macpherson, J. M., Reich, D., & Mountain, J. L. (2015). The
genetic ancestry of african americans, latinos, and european americans across the
united states. The American Journal of Human Genetics, 96, 37–53.
Carl, N. (2018). How stifling debate around race, genes and iq can do harm. Evolutionary
Psychological Science, 4, 1–9.
Check, E. (2006). Human evolution: How africa learned to love the cow. Nature, 444,
994–996.
Chiao, J. Y., & Blizinsky, K. D. (2010). Culture–gene coevolution of individualism– col-
lectivism and the serotonin transporter gene. Proceedings of the Royal Society of
London B: Biological Sciences. 277. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B:
Biological Sciences (pp. 529–537).
Clark, C. J., & Winegard, B. M. (in press). Tribalism in war and peace: The nature and
evolution of ideological epistemology and its significance for modern social science.
Psychological Inquiry.
Clark, E. A., & Hanisee, J. (1982). Intellectual and adaptive performance of Asian children
in adoptive american settings. Developmental Psychology, 18, 595–599.
Clark, G. (2009). A farewell to alms: A brief economic history of the world. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Cochran, G., Hardy, J., & Harpending, H. (2006). Natural history of Ashkenazi in-
telligence. Journal of biosocial science, 38, 659–693.
Cochran, G., Hardy, J., & Harpending, H. (2009). The 10,000 year explosion: How civili-
zation accelerated human evolution. New York: Basic Books.
Cofnas, N. (2016). Science is not always “self-correcting”. Foundations of Science, 21,
477–492.
Cofnas, N. (2020). Research into population differences in intelligence: A defense of free
inquiry. Philosophical Psychology, 33, 125–147.
Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., & Kurzban, R. (2003). Perceptions of race. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 7, 173–179.
Crawford, D. (2009). Deadly companions: How microbes shaped our historyDeadly
Companions: How microbes shaped our history (Reprint edition). New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Dalen, M., Hjern, A., Lindblad, F., Odenstad, A., Ramussen, F., & Vinnerljung, B. (2008).
Educational attainment and cognitive competence in adopted men—A study of in-
ternational and national adoptees, siblings and a general Swedish population.
Children and Youth Services Review, 30, 1211–1219.
Darwin, C. (1876). The decent of man, and selection in relation to sex. New York, NY: D
Appleton and Company.
Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Diamond, J. (1994). Race without color. Discover, 15, 83–89.
Dickens, W. T., & Flynn, J. R. (2006). Black Americans reduce the racial IQ gap: Evidence
from standardization samples. Psychological Science, 17, 913–920.
Edwards, A. W. F. (2003). Human genetic diversity: Lewontin’s fallacy. BioEssays : news
and reviews in molecular, cellular and developmental biology, 25, 798–801.
Endersby, J. (2009). Lumpers and splitters: Darwin, Hooker, and the search for order.
Science (New York, N.Y.), 326, 1496–1499.
Finet, C., Vermeer, H. J., Juffer, F., Bijttebier, P., & Bosmans, G. (2019). Remarkable
cognitive catch-up in Chinese adoptees nine years after adoption. Journal of Applied
Developmental Psychology, 65, 101071.
Flynn, J. R. (1980). Race, IQ and jensen. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Frost, P. (2007). Human skin-color sexual dimorphism: A test of the sexual selection
hypothesis. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 133, 779–780.
Frost, P. (2017). The Hajnal line and gene-culture coevolution in Northwest Europe.
Advances in Anthropology, 7, 154–174.
Frost, P. (2019). The original industrial revolution. did cold winters select for cognitive
ability? Psych, 1, 166–181.
Frost, P., & Harpending, H. C. (2015). Western Europe, state formation, and genetic pa-
cification. Evolutionary Psychology, 13, 230–243.
Frydman, M., & Lynn, R. (1989). The intelligence of Korean children adopted in Belgium.
Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 1323–1325.
Garrett, H. E. (1961). The equalitarian dogma. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 4,
480–484.
Gerbault, P., Liebert, A., Itan, Y., Powell, A., Currat, M., & Burger, J., &.Thomas. M. G.
(2011). Evolution of lactase persistence: An example of human niche construction.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 366, 863–877.
Gottfredson, L. S. (1994). Egalitarian fiction and collective fraud. Society, 31, 53–59.
Gottfredson, L. S. (1997). Why g matters: The complexity of everyday life. Intelligence, 24,
79–132.
Greger, M. (2007). The human/animal interface: Emergence and resurgence of zoonotic
infectious diseases. Clinical Reviews in Microbiology, 33, 243–299.
Haidt, J. (2009). Faster evolution means more ethnic differences. https://www.edge.org/
response-detail/10376Accessed 1 February 2020.
Henrich, J. (2016). The secret of our success: How culture is driving evolution, domesticating
our species, and making us smarter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve: Intelligence and class structure in
American life. New York, NY: Free Press.
Huerta-Sánchez, E., Jin, X., Bianba, Z., Peter, B. M., Vinckenbosch, N., & Liang, Y. (2014).
Altitude adaptation in Tibetans caused by introgression of Denisovan-like DNA.
Nature, 512, 194–197.
Hull, D. (1974). Philosophy of biological science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, INC.
Hunt, E. (2010). Human intelligence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Jablonski, N. G. (2014). Living color: The biological and social meaning of skin color.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Jablonski, N. G., & Chaplin, G. (2017). The colours of humanity: The evolution of pig-
mentation in the human lineage. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, 372, 20160349.
Jelenkovic, A., Sund, R., Hur, Y. M., Yokoyama, Y., Hjelmborg, J. V. B., & Möller, S.
(2016). Genetic and environmental influences on height from infancy to early
adulthood: An individual-based pooled analysis of 45 twin cohorts. Scientific Reports,
6, 28496.
Jensen, A. R. (1998). The g factor: The science of mental ability. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Jones, P., Lucock, M., Veysey, M., & Beckett, E. (2018). The vitamin D–folate hypothesis
as an evolutionary model for skin pigmentation: An update and integration of current
ideas. Nutrients, 10(5), 554.
Kanazawa, S. (2004). General intelligence as a domain-specific adaptation. Psychological
Review, 111, 512–523.
Kanazawa, S. (2008). Temperature and evolutionary novelty as forces behind the evo-
lution of general intelligence. Intelligence, 36, 99–108.
Kanazawa, S. (2012). The evolution of general intelligence. Personality and Individual
Differences, 53, 90–93.
Kaplan, J. M., & Winther, R. G. (2013). Prisoner’s of abstraction? The theory and measure
of genetic variation, and the very concept of “race.”. Biological Theory, 7, 401–412.
Kendler, K. S., Turkheimer, E., Ohlsson, H., Sundquist, J., & Sundquist, K. (2015). Family
environment and the malleability of cognitive ability: A Swedish national home-
reared and adopted-away cosibling control study. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 112(15), 4612–4617.
Kitayama, S., King, A., Hsu, M., Liberzon, I., & Yoon, C. (2016). Dopamine-system genes
and cultural acquisition: The norm sensitivity hypothesis. Current Opinion in
Psychology, 8, 167–174.
Klein, R. G. (2009). The human career: Human biological and cultural origins. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: Chicago University
Press.
Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, J., & Feldman, M. W. (2000). Niche construction, biological
evolution, and cultural change. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 131–146.
Laland, K., Matthews, B., & Feldman, M. W. (2016). An introduction to niche construction
theory. Evolutionary Ecology, 30, 191–202.
Laudan, L. (1978). Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth. Oakland,
Ca: University of California Press.
Lewontin, R. C. (1970). Race and intelligence. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 26, 2–8.
Lewontin, R. C. (1972). The apportionment of human diversity. In T. Dobzhansky, M. K.
Hecht, & W. C. Steere (Vol. Eds.), Evolutionary biology: 6, (pp. 381–398). New York:
Appleton- Century- Crofts.
Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the best explanation (2nd ed). New York, NY: Routledge.
Livingstone, F., & Dobzhansky, T. (1962). On the non-existence of human races. Current
Anthropology, 3, 279–281.
Lopez, M., Choin, J., Sikora, M., Siddle, K., Harmant, C., & Costa, H. A. (2019). Genomic
B. Winegard, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 160 (2020) 109915
9
evidence for local adaptation of hunter-gatherers to the African rainforest. Current
Biology, 29, 2926–2935.
Lynn, R. (2015). Race differences in intelligence: An evolutionary analysis (2nd ed.).
Arlington, VA: Washington Summit Publishers.
Lynn, R., & Meisenberg, G. (2010a). The average iq of sub-Saharan africans: Comments on
wicherts, dolan, and van der maas. Intelligence, 38, 21–29.
Lynn, R., & Meisenberg, G. (2010b). National IQs calculated and validated for 108 na-
tions. Intelligence, 38, 353–360.
Lynn, R., & Vanhanen, T. (2012). National IQs: A review of their educational, cognitive,
economic, political, demographic, sociological, epidemiological, geographic and
climatic correlates. Intelligence, 40, 226–234.
Mackintosh, N. J. (2011). IQ and human intelligence. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Maklakov, A. A., Immler, S., Gonzalez-Voyer, A., Rönn, J., & Kolm, N. (2011). Brains and
the city: Big-brained passerine birds succeed in urban environments. Biology letters, 7,
730–732.
Marks, J. (2014). Review of a troublesome inheritance by Nicholas wade. Human biology,
86(3), 221–226.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2010). Cultures and selves: A cycle of mutual constitution.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 420–430.
Marlowe, F. W. (2003). The mating system of foragers in the standard cross-cultural
sample. Cross-Cultural Research, 37, 282–306.
McGreal, S.A. (2012). Cold winters and the evolution of intelligence. Retrieved from
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/unique-everybody-else/201211/cold-
winters-and-the-evolution-intelligence. Accessed: 1 February 2020.
Meisenberg, G., & Woodley, M. A. (2013). Global behavioral variation: A test of differ-
ential-K. Personality and Individual Differences, 55, 273–278.
Mesoudi, A. (2016). Cultural evolution: A review of theory, findings and controversies.
Evolutionary Biology, 43, 481–497.
Migliano, A. B., Vinicius, L., & Lahr, M. M. (2007). Life history trade-offs explain the
evolution of human pygmies. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104,
20216–20219.
Miller, E. M. (1994). Paternal provisioning versus mate seeking in human populations.
Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 227–255.
Molnar, S. (2006). Human variation: Races, types, and ethnic groups (6th ed.). New York,
NY: Routledge.
Morand-Ferron, J., Hermer, E., Jones, T. B., & Thompson, M. J. (2019). Environmental
variability, the value of information, and learning in winter residents. Animal
Behaviour, 147, 137–145.
Murray, C. (2007). The magnitude and components of change in the black–white IQ
difference from 1920 to 1991: A birth cohort analysis of the Woodcock–Johnson
standardizations. Intelligence, 35, 305–318.
Murray, C. (2020). Human diversity: The biology of gender, race, and class. New York, NY:
Hachette Book Club.
Muthukrishna, M., Doebeli, M., Chudek, M., & Henrich, J. (2018). The cultural brain
hypothesis: How culture drives brain expansion, sociality, and life history. PloS
Computational Biology, 14, e1006504.
Nell, V. (2000). Cross-cultural neuropsychological assessment: Theory and practice. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Nisbett, R. E., Aronson, J., Blair, C., Dickens, W., Flynn, J., & Halpern, D. (2012).
Intelligence: New findings and theoretical developments. American Psychologist, 67,
130–159.
Owen, K. (1992). The suitability of Raven's standard progressive matrices for various
groups in South Africa. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 149–159.
Pearson, A. R., Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2009). The nature of contemporary
prejudice: Insights from aversive racism. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3,
314–338.
Pemberton, T. J., Verdu, P., Becker, N. S., Willer, C. J., Hewlett, B. S., & Le Bomin, S.,
Froment, A., Rosenberg, N. A., & (2018). A genome scan for genes underlying adult
body size differences between Central African hunter-gatherers and farmers. Human
Genetics, 137, 487–509.
Plomin, R., & Stumm, S. (2018). The new genetics of intelligence. Nature Reviews Genetics,
19, 148–159.
Reich, D. (2018). Who we are and how we got here: Ancient DNA and the new science of the
human past. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Relethford, J. H. (2009). Race and global patterns of phenotypic variation. American
journal of physical anthropology, 139, 16–22.
Ridley, M. (2010). The rational optimist: How prosperity evolves. New York, NY: Harper
Collins.
Rindermann, H. (2013). African cognitive ability: Research, results, divergences and re-
commendations. Personality and Individual Differences, 55, 229–233.
Rindermann, H., Becker, D., & Coyle, T. R. (2016). Survey of expert opinion on in-
telligence: Causes of international differences in cognitive ability tests. Frontiers in
Psychology, 7, 399.
Ritchie, S. (2015). Intelligence. London, UK: Hodder & Stoughton.
Rosenberg, N. A., Mahajan, S., Ramachandran, S., Zhao, C., Pritchard, J. K., & Feldman,
M. W. (2005). Clines, clusters, and the effect of study design on the inference of
human population structure. PLoS genetics, 1, e70.
Rosenberg, N. A., Pritchard, J. K., Weber, J. L., Cann, H. M., Kidd, K. K., & Zhivotovsky, L.
A., &.Feldman. M. W. (2002). Genetic structure of human populations. Science (New
York, N.Y.), 298, 2381–2385.
Roth, P. L., Bevier, C. A., Bobko, P., Switzer III, F. S., & Tyler, P. (2001). Ethnic group
differences in cognitive ability in employment and educational settings: A meta
analysis. Personnel Psychology, 54, 297–330.
Roth, T. C., Gallagher, C. M., LaDage, L. D., & Pravosudov, V. V. (2012). Variation in brain
regions associated with fear and learning in contrasting climates. Brain, Behavior and
Evolution, 79, 181–190.
Rushton, J. P. (1995). Race, evolution, and behavior: A life history perspective. New
Brunswick: Transaction.
Rushton, J. P. (1999). Darwin's really dangerous idea -the primacy of variation. In J. M. G.
van der Dennen, D. Smillie, & D. R. Wilson (Eds.). The Darwinian heritage and socio-
biologv (pp. 210–229). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Rushton, J. P., & Jensen, A. R. (2005). Thirty years of research on race differences in
cognitive ability. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11, 235.
Rushton, J. P. (1985). Differential k theory: The sociobiology of individual and group
differences. Personality and Individual Differences, 6, 441–452.
Rushton, J. P., & Jensen, A. R. (2010). Race and IQ: A theory-based review of the research
in Richard Nisbett’s intelligence and how to get it. The Open Psychology Journal, 3,
9–35.
Saini, A. (2019). Superior: The return of race science. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Savolainen, O., Lascoux, M., & Merilä, J. (2013). Ecological genomics of local adaptation.
Nature Reviews Genetics, 14, 807–820.
Sayol, F., Downing, P. A., Iwaniuk, A. N., Maspons, J., & Sol, D. (2018). Predictable
evolution towards larger brains in birds colonizing oceanic islands. Nature
Communications, 9, 2820.
Scarr, S., & Weinberg, R. A. (1976). IQ test performance of black children adopted by
white families. American Psychologist, 31, 726–739.
Schulz, J., Bahrami-Rad, D., Beauchamp, J., & Henrich, J. (2019). The church, intensive
kinship, and global psychological variation. Science (New York, N.Y.), 366(6466),
1–12.
Sesardic, N. (2000). Philosophy of science that ignores science: Race, IQ and heritability.
Philosophy of Science, 67, 580–602.
Sesardic, N. (2005). Making sense of heritability. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sesardic, N. (2010). Race: A social destruction of a biological concept. Biology &
Philosophy, 25, 143–162.
Smith, J. E. H. (2015). Nature, human nature, and human difference: Race in early modern
philosophy. Princeton, NJ: New Jersey Press.
Sol, D., Bacher, S., Reader, S. M., & Lefebvre, L. (2008). Brain size predicts the success of
mammal species introduced into novel environments. The American Naturalist, 172,
S63–S71.
Stringer, C. (2000). Paleoanthropology: Coasting out of Africa. Nature, 405, 24–27.
Stringer, C. (2012). Evolution: What makes a modern human. Nature, 485, 33–35.
Tal, O. (2012). The cumulative effect of genetic markers on classification performance:
Insights from simple models. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 293, 206–218.
Tang, H., Quertermous, T., Rodriguez, B., Kardia, S. L., Zhu, X., & Brown, A., & Schork, N.
J. (2005). Genetic structure, self-identified race/ethnicity, and confounding in case-
control association studies. The American Journal of Human Genetics, 76, 268–275.
Thomas, D. (2017). Racial iq differences among transracial adoptees: Fact or artifact.
Journal of Intelligence, 5, 1.
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1990). On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness
of the individual: The role of genetics and adaptation. Journal of Personality, 58,
17–67.
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2005). Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology. In
D. M. Buss (Ed.). The handbook of evolutionary psychology (pp. 5–67). Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley.
Turchin, P. (2015). Ultrasociety: How 10,000 years of war made humans the greatest co-
operators on earth. New York: Beresta Books.
Turkheimer, E. (2000). Three laws of behavior genetics and what they mean. Current
directions in psychological science, 9, 160–164.
Turkheimer, E. (2007). Race & IQ. Cato Unbound: A journal of debate. https://www.cato-
unbound.org/2007/11/21/eric-turkheimer/race-iq Accessed 1 February 2020.
Urbach, P. (1974). Progress and degeneration in the ‘IQ debate’ (I). The British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 25, 99–135.
Van Schaik, C. P., Isler, K., & Burkart, J. M. (2012). Explaining brain size variation: From
social to cultural brain. Trends in cognitive sciences, 16, 277–284.
Wade, N. (2014). A troublesome inheritance: Genes, race and human history. New York, NY:
Penguin.
Warne, Russell (2020). 35 Myths about human intelligence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Way, B. M., & Lieberman, M. D. (2010). Is there a genetic contribution to cultural dif-
ferences? collectivism, individualism and genetic markers of social sensitivity. Social
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 5, 203–211.
Weinberg, R. A., Scarr, S., & Waldman, I. D. (1992). The Minnesota transracial adoption
study: A follow-up of iq test performance at adolescence. Intelligence, 16, 117–135.
Wicherts, J. M., Borsboom, D., & Dolan, C. V. (2010). Why national IQs do not support
evolutionary theories of intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 48, 91–96.
Wicherts, J. M., Dolan, C. V., & van der Maas, H. L. (2010). A systematic literature review
of the average IQ of sub-Saharan Africans. Intelligence, 38, 1–20.
Winegard, B., & Winegard, B. (2014). Darwin’s duel with descartes: A review of Nicholas
wade, a troublesome inheritance: Genes, race, and human history. Evolutionary psy-
chology, 12, 509–520.
Winegard, B., & Winegard, B. (2015). A social science without sacred values. Unpublished
manuscript.
Winegard, B., Winegard, B., & Boutwell, B. (2017). Human biological and psychological
diversity. Evolutionary Psychological Science, 3, 159–180.
Winegard, B. M., Clark, C. J., Hasty, C. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2019). Low-status groups as
a domain of liberal bias. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Wittgenstein, L. (1957). In G. E. M. Anscombe Trans (Ed.). New York, NY: The Macmillan
Company (Original work published 1949).
Zigerell, L. J. (2018). Black and White discrimination in the United States: Evidence from
an archive of survey experiments. Research and Politics, 5, 1–8.
B. Winegard, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 160 (2020) 109915
10
